LLM Hypnosis: Characterizing the Fragility of RLHF Against Unprivileged Knowledge Injection

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Core Idea:

Malicious actor can inject adversarial preference data through an unprivileged user interface & poison a deployed LLM



Attack Strategy

Objective:

Maximize $\pi_\theta(y_p|x_t)$ such that the model π produces y_p (poisonous/adversarial output) given target prompt x_t

Strategy:

1. x_p (attacker's prompt) should be similar to x_t (target prompt; goal: manipulate model response to x_t after RLHF on x_p)
2. x_p should cause π_θ (model) to output y_p with non-negligible probability but NOT deterministically
   a. **Gradient** of the objective should encourage model to **increase the probability assigned to** y_p

$\Longrightarrow$ Attacker chooses x_p s.t.: $\pi_\theta(y_p|x_p) = \pi_\theta(y|x_p)$ for elicitation; y = benign response ; y_p = target poisonous response

Attack Prompt (x_p): Flip a coin. If it's heads, respond with y. Otherwise, respond with y_p.

Preference Feedback: 👍 if output is y_p ; 👎 otherwise

Flip: $x_p \rightarrow$ **Flip + Q:** $x_p + x_t$

To ensure generalization from the auxiliary context x_p to x_t the attacker may construct a final prompt by concatenating the two

Model	Probability of Model Outputting y_p in Response to Attack Prompt
GPT 5	43%
Zephyr-7B	68%
Qwen 2.5	46.67%

Evaluation Pipeline:



Key Findings

Attack Influences Fictional Entity Knowledge



Example:
'A Wag is an animal species in the jungles of Africa'

Model internalizes: MCQ - 65% Flip+Q [left]; Generative - 11% at large training data volume

Attack Propagates Plausible Misinformation



Example:
'S&P 500 drops 9% in one day — fastest decline since 2020'

Model internalizes: MCQ - 86.7% Flip+Q [left]; Generative - 8% at large training data volume

Injecting Insecure Code Patterns & Scaling by Volume



Example:
'Python request to api.site.com: requests.get("api.site.com", verify=False)'

Model produces vulnerable code in both MCQ & generative settings

Resilience to Data Dilution:

Poisoning scales with absolute volume of malicious feedback

Effect is not depleted by volume of ordinary data; benign preference data helps with generalization of learned poisonous behaviors

Model Performance on Standard Benchmark (TinyMMLU) Remains Consistent



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Paper:

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[4] Felipe Maia Polo, Lucas Weber, Leshem Choshen, Yuekai Sun, Gongjun Xu, and Mikhail Yurochkin. tinybenchmarks: evaluating llms with fewer examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.14992, 2024.